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I. Introduction
The global spread of antitrust has presented opportunities and challenges for consum-
ers, businesses, and antitrust agencies alike. While the embrace of antitrust in jurisdic-
tions from Albania to Zambia, and in countries as diverse as China, Russia, and South
Africa, is a ringing endorsement of the power of free markets to enhance consumer wel-
fare, it presents challenges that command more attention. As commerce increasingly spills
across national borders, transactions and business conduct come under review in multiple
jurisdictions. Fueled by a couple of high-profile conflicts, concern about multiple juris-
dictions reaching inconsistent conclusions about the same conduct began to grow. With
those concerns came calls to bring consistency to global standards. Proposals to create a
global antitrust regime, however, failed to win a consensus. Those proposals involved
ambitious efforts to create a new international antitrust order around commonly accepted
norms. Such efforts were based on an overly optimistic view of the appetite for any such
new order. As it became clear that there was little inclination to cede national sovereignty
in this key policy area to an untested international body, the focus switched to a more
modest outlook centered on a model of convergence within a network of national antitrust
agencies, supported by international organizations and non-government advisors.
Through the International Competition Network, real progress has been made in the
effort to bring divergent systems closer together without the need to intrude on sovereign
control of national antitrust regimes.
This article sketches out the path that has led us to where we are today. In Section 11
we consider the spread of antitrust that has given rise to calls for international coordina-
tion in this area. Section III looks to the benefits and challenges that resulted from this
spread. The ultimately unsuccessful search for global rules is examined in Section IV.
Section V discusses convergence as an alternative to global rules, and Section VI illustrates
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how that process took place in the international antitrust context through the Interna-
tional Competition Network (ICN). Finally, in Section VII, we address some of the les-
sons learned from the process.
II. The Global Spread of Antitrust
Until the mid-twentieth century, the United States was virtually the only nation in the
world with an antitrust regime.' In the years following World War II, a handful of other
jurisdictions began to follow suit, including Germany and Japan, as to which antitrust was
seen as a tool to remedy the economic structures that had been perceived to support fas-
cism. 2 This shift was not the immediate harbinger of a global embrace of antitrust, and
indeed, a quarter century ago, any discussion of international antitrust would have focused
on several well-publicized instances of conflict. This is embodied by the observation of
Britain's Lord Wilberforce in the House of Lords' 1978 judgment in the uranium cartel
litigation: "It is axiomatic that in anti-trust matters the policy of one state may be to
defend what it is the policy of another state to attack;" 3 and by the transatlantic battle of
injunctions surrounding the Laker Airways antitrust litigation.4 But as understanding of
the benefits of competition and the harmful effects of anticompetitive practices grew, a
trend towards the global embrace of competition principles began. By 1990, antitrust
legislation had been adopted in several dozen jurisdictions, including the European
Union, India, Brazil, South Africa, and Norway.
The floodgates opened after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The nations of the former
Soviet Bloc, including Russia itself, recognized the importance of competition policy as a
necessary tool if functioning market economies were to effectively supplant the command
and control regimes imposed by communist rule. Likewise, many nations in Latin
America recognized that competition policy would be needed to address the monopolistic
market structures that had characterized that region. Today, competition legislation is
pervasive. Over 100 jurisdictions are covered by competition legislation, either at the
national or regional level. With the passage of China's Antimonopoly Law in 2007,5 the
list now includes almost all of the most significant economies in the world, 6 as well as
1. Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Stat. 209-10 (1891) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2004)). In
fact, the Sherman Act was preceded by Canada's Act for the Prevention and Suppression of Combinations
Found in Restraint of Trade, 1889 S.C., ch. 41 (Can.). Other jurisdictions, such as England, had common law
principles on restraint of trade that also preceded the Sherman Act.
2. N.I. SILBER, WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: THE LIFE OF PHILIP ELMAN 148-49 (2004).
3. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] A.C. 547, 617 (H.L).
4. See Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See generally
Deborah K. Owen & John J. Parisi, International Mergers and Joint Ventures: A Federal Trade Commission
Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL MERGERS & JOINT VENTURES: 1990 FORDIIAMI CORPORATE LAw 8, nn. 19-
20 (Barry Hawk ed., 1991).
5. See Anti-Monopoly Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007,
effective Aug. 1, 2008), translation available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDIEN/Laws/GeneralLawsand
Regulations/BasicLaws/P020071012533593599575.pdf (P.R.C.).
6. Of the forty largest economies identified by the World Bank in 2007, only Saudi Arabia (24), Iran (29),
and Hong Kong (36) currently lack antitrust legislation. Legislation is pending in Hong Kong. See World
Bank, World Development Indicators Database (Sept. 10, 2008), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATAS-
TATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf; Pierson, M&A Regulation Catching On Globally: Survey, LAW 360, Jan. 8,
2009, available at http://www.law360.com/articles/822 56.
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jurisdictions as small as Malawi, Barbados, Suriname, the Gambia, and Moldova. In the
area of merger review, sixty-six jurisdictions have identified themselves to the ICN as
having merger review regimes in place.7
HI. Effects of the Global Spread of Antitrust
The enthusiasm with which antitrust doctrine has been embraced illustrates the per-
ceived utility of antitrust to a market-organizing set of principles. Whether to promote
economic efficiency, to counteract the historical effects of policies that encouraged mo-
nopolies, to promote economic integration, or to enhance consumer welfare, competition
policy became an arrow in the quiver of economic reformers of all stripes. While the
motivation for embracing antitrust varied, the consensus behind antitrust stretched across
much of the global political spectrum.
The consensus as to the benefit of market economics notwithstanding, the proliferation
of antitrust legislation created an obvious potential for conflict among jurisdictions.
While a broad consensus may form around the idea that price-fixing cartels are undesir-
able, or that exclusionary practices by monopolists are cause for concern, titrating specific
antitrust enforcement actions to fulfill those goals is far from an exact science. Reasonable
minds may differ as to the meaning of consumer welfare and what maximizes it. Such
divergence of opinion may theoretically be disciplined by the application of well-reasoned
economic principles. Even among established and sophisticated antitrust agencies, how-
ever, different conclusions can emerge from the same set of facts. For a fledgling agency,
finding the appropriate level of enforcement is even more challenging and the dangers for
consumers whose welfare it seeks to promote more acute.
Finding the appropriate level of enforcement lies at the heart of one of the principal
challenges presented by the spread of antitrust regimes, namely achieving an appropriate
balance between the risks of over-enforcement and under-enforcement of the law.
Under-enforcement will do little to advance any goal of antitrust law, whether the goal is
consumer welfare, economic integration, de-monopolization, or the promotion of effi-
ciency. On the other hand, over-enforcement may chill the very sort of competitive be-
havior that competition laws seek to encourage because vigorous competition on the
merits and anticompetitive exclusionary conduct may both seek to dominate or even anni-
hilate competitors. Accurately distinguishing between the two requires a practiced eye
informed by meticulous gathering of data and economic analysis. Yet to the extent that
practiced eyes hold differing views, that distinction may exist primarily in the eye of the
beholder. Consequently, conduct that may be encouraged under one approach to compe-
tition could be judged illegal under another. The resulting differences may well create
regulatory hurdles for cross-border businesses.
Merger review offers the clearest example of the potential conflict presented by the
existence of multiple sovereign competition regimes. Where a single transaction touches
multiple jurisdictions, the merger review requirements of each jurisdiction must be ob-
served. Depending on the nature of the transaction and the review regime in place, this
necessity may lead to multiple time-consuming and expensive filings each requiring local
7. See Intern'l Competition Network, Merger Review Laws, Related Materials, and Templates, http://
www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/index.php/en/publication/293 (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
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expertise as to procedural and substantive detail. The blocking of the transaction by even
one jurisdiction could potentially condemn the deal entirely. Thus, assuming that each
jurisdiction is essential to the deal, the jurisdiction most likely to block the transaction
may set the de facto standard across the board.s Transactions not likely to survive the
rigors of such multi-faceted review may never be undertaken given their likelihood of
regulatory failure after substantial expenditure. 9 Accordingly, where consumer welfare is
not served by the blocking jurisdiction, this harm could spread to all jurisdictions that
stood to benefit from the deal.
Fortunately, in practice this scenario rarely comes to pass. Antitrust agencies routinely
and consistently cooperate in resolving merger cases under mutual review by multiple
jurisdictions. The vast majority of these have been resolved successfully,' 0 and conflicting
standards have imperiled only a handful of global mergers. When such divergences do
occur, however, they attract such disproportionate coverage that they are often regarded
as more frequent than is the case. The two cases in which conflict arose, Boeing/McDon-
nell Douglas (1997) and GE/Honeywell (2001) involved unusual vertical issues that led
agencies in the United States and the European Union to reach different outcomes, are
most commonly cited as evidence that antitrust on the global stage is in urgent and dire
need of reform.
The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case combined two of the three most significant man-
ufacturers of jet airliners. Both the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the European
Commission agreed that McDonnell Douglas had ceased to be an effective competitor
and that the market was already, as a practical matter, a duopoly between Boeing and
Airbus. While the FTC approved the deal, the European Commission objected because it
feared that the merger would suppress competition by boosting Boeing's ties to the air-
lines and enabling Boeing to use McDonnell Douglas' defense research and development
funds to enhance its commercial operations.' These concerns reflected a basic difference
between European Union and United States merger policy. The dispute was ultimately
resolved by a European Commission order requiring certain of Boeing's contracts with
airlines to be revised, which allowed the deal to proceed. 12
8. TiinothyJ. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Address at the Brookings Institution Roundtable on
Trade and Investment Policy: Meager Enforcement in a World of Multiple Arbiters (Dec. 21, 2001), http://
www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/brookings.pdf [hereinafter Muris Speech].
9. Indeed, the false-positive effects of over-enforcement are difficult to measure and, by their nature, often
remain invisible. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lamley, Antitrust Law and Regudarory Gaming (Stanford
Law Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 367), available at http://papers.ssm.
com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=12 8 7221; John Fingleton & Ali Nikpay, Speech to the Fordham Annual
Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy in New York: Stimulating or Chilling Competition
(Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared-oft/speeches/sp008.pdf.
10. See, e.g., U.S. DFP'T OF JUSTICE, INT'L CONIPFTITION POLICY ADVISORY COMM., FINAL REPORT
(Feb. 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm [hereinafter 1CPAC Report] (describ-
ing the 1998 Federal-Mogul/T&N merger that involved the FTC and four European agencies); INrERNA-
TiONAL ANIrFRusr LAW AND POLIcy: 2004 FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW 350-52 (Barry Hawk ed., 2004)
(describing the Beyer/Aventis CropScience merger, which involved complex remedies negotiated coopera-
tively between FTC, the EC, and the Canadian Competition Bureau); Id. at 353-54 (describing the Sanofi/
Aventis merger).
11. Commission Case Comp/M.877 Boeing / McDonnell Douglas of 30 July 1997.
12. See William E. Kovacic, Transatlantic Turbulence: The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger and International
Competition Policy, 68 AN-IiTRusT L.J. 805 (2001).
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In GE/Honeywell, the proposed merger would have combined a firm that manufac-
tured aircraft engines and one that manufactured aircraft avionics. The U.S. Department
of Justice saw no fundamental threat to competition and approved the deal with relatively
minor divestitures. The European Commission, on the other hand, concluded that a
combined firm would be so efficient that it could offer a combined package of engines and
avionics priced so low that it risked pricing the competition out of the market.13 The deal
was ultimately blocked, despite protests by the U.S. Justice Department and others that
the market was sufficiently robust that competing engine and avionics manufacturers
could be relied upon to develop competitive responses to the merger.14
Significantly, there have been no such cases since then. These two cases, both of which
are now over seven years old, constitute the universe of conflict between the U.S. agencies
and the European Commission in the merger field. Despite a deep and growing practice
of United States/European Union cooperation in merger cases that has resolved most
cases under common examination in coordinated and cooperative fashion,15 these two
cases generated a firestorm of commentary that fueled the perception that the United
States and the European Union antitrust policy is awash in conflict. 16
IV. Efforts to Create Global Rules
In light of the potential for antitrust clashes to create ongoing obstacles to cross-border
deals and concerns about cross-border effects of anticompetitive conduct, efforts to de-
velop a global approach to competition policy are hardly surprising. Several proposals
emerged to create a transnational regime, akin to that found in the international trade
community in the form of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATF), the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and other instruments enforced
through the World Trade Organization. These proposals ultimately foundered, largely
over concerns that global antitrust rules would be unable to accommodate differences in
substantive approach to antitrust, the amenability of transnational disputes over competi-
tion law to binding dispute settlement, and uncertainties as to whether developed and
developing countries truly had common interests at heart.
A. INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION
In 1948, amid a flurry of new international economic organizations in the post-war
period, a Charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO) was drafted. 17 This
Charter, also known as the Havana Charter, included international cartel provisions. Ul-
timately, however, the ITO was rejected by the U.S. Congress, in part because of the
antitrust provisions. As Diane Wood reports, this rejection appeared as somewhat ironic
13. Commission Case Comp/M.2220 General Electric / Honeywell of 3 July 2001.
14. See Muris Speech, supra note 8.
15. Randolph W. Tritell, InternationalAntitrust Convergence: A Positive View, ANTITRUST, Summer 2005, at
25, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/intemational/docs/tritellpostiveview.pdf.
16. See, e.g., Tom Brown, Update 2-U.S. Treasury Cbief Slaps at Europe Over GE Deal, REUTE -RS, June 27,
2001; Davis and Raghavan, Divergent Histories Helped to Scuttle GE-Honeywell Deal-Competitors vs. Customers:
Both EU, U.S. Show Biases-Could Augur a Hiatus for Megadeals, WALL. ST. J. ASIA, July 5, 2001.
17. See Diane P. Wood, The impossible Dream: Real InternationalAntitrust, 1992 U. CI. LEGAL F. 277, 281
(1992).
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given that the Americans were the greatest proponents for antitrust at the time. It was, in
fact, this very commitment to antitrust, however, that lay behind the congressional rejec-
tion: "Congress was not ready to cede any antitrust jurisdiction to the international mech-
anisms established by the Charter, and furthermore, it found the language on restrictive
business practices to be too weak, as compared with the prevailing U.S. standards on these
matters."18
B. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
Following a 1995 E.U. proposal, the World Trade Organization set up a Working
Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy to consider, among
other things, the integration of national competition laws. 19 Among the proposals consid-
ered was a binding framework of international competition rules leading to comprehen-
sive harmonization. This initiative led to significantly scaled back language in the Doha
WTO Ministerial Declaration in November 2001. The Doha Declaration called for a
commitment to "core" antitrust principles, enhanced cooperation between agencies, tech-
nical assistance, and continued work within the Working Group on the Interaction be-
tween Trade and Competition Policy to clarify core principles. 20 Proposals for
competition rules in the V/TO were dropped, however, at the Fifth Ministerial Confer-
ence held in Cancun in September 2003.21
The initial efforts to deal with international antitrust concerns in the V/TO stemmed
from a model based on global rules. No consensus existed, however, for national antitrust
systems to cede control to a trade-based system that was perceived by many as inherently
less suited to the needs of national economies and legal systems than what was already in
place at the national level and could lead to the undermining of prosecutorial discretion.
Developing countries were concerned about their capacity to absorb and effectively imple-
ment competition rules. While the proposals contained in the 2001 Doha Declaration
were less radical in substance, concerns persisted that the WTO was not an ideal institu-
tion within which to frame any global antitrust regime. The Report of the International
Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC), issued in 2000, made clear its objections to
any such plan. 22 The ICPAC Report noted that while the VFTO did have a legitimate role
to play in certain aspects of antitrust law and policy, "not all competition policy problems
are trade problems."23 In addition, the V/TO's operational structure, with a focus on the
negotiation of rules followed by dispute resolution, was considered ill-suited to the day-
to-day needs of an antitrust agency, which were thought to require "to be discussed
broadly and in a consultative manner."24 Moreover, the ICPAC Report noted the reluc-
18. Id. at 284.
19. See Mariana Bode & Oliver Budzinski, Competing Ways Towards International Antitrnst: The PVTO Versus
the ICN (Marburg Papers on Econ., Working Paper No. 03-2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.consol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=888682.
20. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/l, 41
I.L.M. 746 (2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/min0l_e/mindecl-e.htn.
[hereinafter Doha Declaration].
21. See Bode & Budzinski, supra note 19, at 12.
22. ICPAC Report, supra note 10.
23. Id. at 282.
24. Id. at 283.
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tance of individual countries to surrender control of their antitrust systems to a suprana-
tional body, stating that "[olnly a limited range of competition matters, if any, are likely to
bear fruit in any organization that requires a binding commitment from nations."25
V. Convergence as an Alternative
The absence of consensus about global antitrust rules, however, did not address the very
real problems presented by the proliferation of antitrust laws and the potential for conflict
between jurisdictions. In lieu of a rules-based system, the idea of seeking to resolve con-
flict through convergence began to be explored. Neither the idea of informal cooperation
in the international sphere nor the idea of soft convergence were new, but combining the
ideas created a powerful engine that could build a global consensus in a way that a rules-
based system could not.
As former FTC Chairman Timothy Muris has pointed out, dissimilarities exist in many
systems of law, yet progress is often achieved towards commonly accepted standards.2 6
Muris identified three stages of the process of convergence. The first stage is decentral-
ized implementation, where different jurisdictions experiment with different processes and
substantive standards. The second involves building consensus, where experts in and out
of government study the results of the first phase and identify better approaches. The
third stage is where individual jurisdictions opt in to better approaches, not from compul-
sion but out of recognition that the better approaches are superior.2 7 The law of con-
tracts, for example, evolved through such a process.
Contract law in the United States was principally a creation of state common and statu-
tory law. When most commerce was local, divergence was tolerable. With advances in
communication, transportation, and the development of national commerce, those local
differences began to function as barriers to trade. The second stage of the convergence
process began in the 1930s through the efforts of the American Law Institute (ALI).2s
The ALl, consisting of recognized legal experts who draft "restatements" of the law that
identify general areas of agreement and consensus views about superior solutions to
problems that some states addressed differently, published the first Restatement of Con-
tracts in 1932.29 In the 1940s, the ALl and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) combined forces to study state commercial statutes. In
1954, the two bodies proposed a new Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).30 Eventually
forty-nine states and the District of Columbia adopted a version of the UCC. Today, as
Muris observes, differences among state contract laws in the United States are relatively
minor:
25. Id.
26. Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Address at the Annual Lecture of the European
Foreign Affairs Review: Competition Agencies in a Market-Based Global Economy (July 23, 2002), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/020723brussels.shtm (hereinafter Second Muris Speech].
27. Id. § 1.
28. Id.; See generally, HERBERT GOODRICH & PAUL A. WOLKIN, THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN LAW
INsTrrTE 1923-1961 (1961).
29. See generally RYSTATEMENT OF CONrRACi's (1932). The Restatement was followed by a second Re-
statement in 1981. See generally, RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTs (1981).
30. Second Muris Speech, supra note 26, § I; See U.C.C. (1954).
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Several points from these contract and antitrust examples stand out. First, the stan-
dards emerged through decentralized experiments. The experience of the 50 states
supplied the raw material for the Restatement and the UCC .... Second, coopera-
tion by government and non-government officials helped build the consensus about
specific standards. ALI's work on the Restatement of Contracts and the similar work
of ALI and NCCUSL on the UCC show how cooperation by experts in and out of
government can identify superior standards .... Third, the acceptance of the best
practices took place voluntarily. No legal rule told judges to use the Restatement of
Contracts. No legal command made state legislators embrace the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. . . . The standards gained adherents by the power of their intellectual
vision and their success in implementation. 31
The question thus became whether this process could work in the international anti-
trust area, and, if so, what would be the best forum for pursuing convergence. Several
were considered.
A. ORGANISATION OF ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
The Competition Committee of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD) was one of the first institutions to serve as a discussion forum about
international competition issues. The OECD adopted its Revised Recommendation of the
Council Concerning Cooperation Between Member Countries on Anticompetitive Practices Affect-
ing International Trade in 1995 as a voluntary set of rules.32 Other initiatives have included
the 1998 Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Car-
tels.33 As Wood notes, "Over the years, the OECD has served on numerous occasions as a
forum for member countries to find common ground with respect to competition law." 34
For all its success, however, there are several limitations to the OECD as a forum for
international antitrust. The OECD's thirty country membership represents the most eco-
nomically advanced nations of the world and is limited to the remainder of the world only
as occasional observers and as participants in specialized forums, such as the Global Fo-
rum on Competition and the Latin American Competition Forum. Moreover, member-
ship in the OECD exists at the state level, and competition agencies participate only as
part of national delegations that may represent other policy interests.
B. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) includes a
competition group that convenes an Experts Meeting on competition on a regular basis.
31. Second Muris Speech, supra note 26, § I,
32. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Revised Recommendation of the
Council Concerning Cooperation Between Member Countries on Anticompetitive Practices Affecting International
Trade (Sept. 21, 1995), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/42/21570317.pdf.
33. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Recommendation of the Coun-
cil Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels (Mar. 25, 1998), available at http://webdominol.
oecd.org/horizontal/oecdacts.nsf/linkto/C(98)35.
34. Diane P. Wood, Soft Harmonization and Competition Laws: Track Record and Prospects, AN-rTRUST BUL-
LETIN, Summer 2003, at 311.
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UNCTAD's efforts resulted in the adoption by the U.N. General Assembly in 1980 of the
Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rule for the Control of Restrictive Business
Practices (The Set).35 The Set includes a number of well-recognized principles of antitrust
law, but the process has not resulted in its gaining widespread acceptance as a source of
international antitrust law. Like OECD, membership in the United Nations is reserved
for states, and agencies participate, if at all, as part of national delegations. UNCTAD is
broadly inclusive in that virtually all nations are members of the United Nations, and
developing nations that are not OECD members are full participants. Its meetings, how-
ever, are heavily populated by resident diplomats who are not well-versed in competition
issues, and much of the work product is driven by a professional secretariat.
C. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK
The ICPAC Report in 2000 recommended the establishment of a new movement called
the Global Competition Initiative, "to create a home for addressing the entire global com-
petition agenda." 36 As explained in the ICPAC Report, "[t]he point of this proposed
Global Competition Initiative would be to foster dialogue among officials along with
broader communities to produce more convergence of law and analysis, common under-
standings and common culture." 37 While the ICPAC Report addressed some of the issues
that the envisioned Global Competition Initiative would tackle, 38 it was accepted that the
agenda would be "driven by the interests of the participating governments." 39
In 2001, the International Bar Association brought together representatives of antitrust
authorities from around the world at Ditchley Park, England where the idea of a body
such as the Global Competition Initiative was discussed.40 In October 2001, following the
endorsements of FTC Chairman Muris, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Charles
James, and Commissioner Mario Monti, the International Competition Network (ICN),
modeled on the Global Competition Initiative, was launched on the margins of the Ford-
ham International Competition Law Conference.
The ICN currently lists 103 antitrust authorities from across the world as members. 41
The objectives of the body are to allow for "a dynamic dialogue that serves to build con-
sensus and convergence towards sound competition policy principles across the global
antitrust community."42 Some aspects of its governing structure were partially informed
by a consumer protection enforcement network, known today as the International Con-
35. See Wood, supra note 17, at 285-86.
36. See ICPAC Report, supra note 10, at 281.
37. Id. at 284.
38. Namely, the deepening of positive comity, best practices; government exemptions and immunities;
multinational merger control; "frontier subjects" such as e-commerce; collaborative analysis; dispute resolu-
tion; and technical assistance. Id. at 284-88.
39. Id. at 285.
40. See Bode & Budzinski, supra note 19; See also, J. William Rowley, The Internationalization of Merger
Review: Towards Global Solutions, INrERN'L COMPETITION NETWORK, FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE (Sept.
28-29, 2002), http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/mediaibrary/conferencelst naples_2002/
rowleyicn-naples.pdf.
41. Intem'l Competition Network, ICN Membership Contact List (January 2008), http://www.intema-
tionalcompetitionnetwork.org/pdf/ICN-ContactList.pdf.
42. Intern'l Competition Network, About ICN, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/in-
dex.php/en/about-icn (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
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sumer Protection Enforcement Network, 43 in which the FTC participated along with
other national authorities that had shared competition and consumer protection responsi-
bilities. The ICN operates through working groups consisting of representatives of the
member country antitrust authorities, international organizations such as the OECD and
the World Bank, and non-government advisors that focus on specific projects. These
working groups function without a formal secretariat, communicating principally through
conference calls and e-mail and meeting at an annual meeting hosted by a member coun-
try. Importantly, the ICN does not exercise any rule-making function. Rather, "where
the ICN reaches consensus on recommendations, or 'best practices', arising from the
projects, individual competition authorities decide whether and how to implement the
recommendations, through unilateral, bilateral or multilateral arrangements, as appropri-
ate."44 ICN work product usually takes the form of recommended practices, reports, and
manuals.
VI. The ICN as a Convergence Success Story
In its relatively short lifespan, the ICN has been extraordinarily successful as a forum in
which experts, from both inside and outside governments, have worked together to de-
velop consensus about superior practices. Many of these are finding their way into na-
tional legislation and procedural functions. Equally significant, it has served as a forum
for competition agencies leaders and staff to meet and build the kind of individual connec-
tions that facilitate day-to-day cooperation.
The participation of non-government advisors has been critical to the success of the
ICN. Obtaining buy-in from the private sector, the principal "customer" of competition
legislation in the first place, is essential. Non-government advisors participate in all as-
pects of the ICN's work alongside its members.
While members alone make decisions as to the adoption of recommended practices or
other work product, all decision-making within the ICN is by consensus. This ensures
that no one powerful group of members can force smaller members to adopt recommen-
dations against their will. The process creates incentives for inclusion and cooperation
among members.
Projects addressed by the ICN are selected by its members and have included work on
mergers, cartels, single-firm conduct, competition policy implementation, competition
advocacy, enforcement in regulated sectors, and telecommunications, among others. The
following is a brief examination of some of the ICN's key projects:
A. MERGERS
The first major area tackled by the ICN is in the area of merger notification and proce-
dures. Since the passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in the United States in 1976, over
seventy countries have adopted pre-merger notification regimes. However, their proce-
dural requirements diverged substantially. In some countries, for example, notification
was voluntary, while in others it was mandatory. In some, firms seeking to merge must
43. See Intern'l Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network, http://wwwicpen.org (last visited Apr. 5,
2009).
44. About ICN, supra note 42.
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first obtain affirmative permission to merge; in others, such as in the United States, a
merger can proceed without affirmative approval so long as notification has taken place,
and the requisite waiting periods have expired. 4s In yet other countries, firms were free to
merge at any time but risked the specter of divestiture should approval later be denied. In
some countries, the time within which an agency was required to make a decision was
fixed by statute, while in others, decisions could be delayed for an indefinite period. The
quantity of information demanded varied, as did the degree of subjectivity needed to re-
spond to questions posed by the competition agency. Perhaps most significantly, some
jurisdictions required that the transaction have a nexus to their jurisdiction, and others
required notification when only one party had a local nexus, and the transaction itself had
no connection to the reviewing jurisdiction.
In response to these and other concerns, the ICN undertook a detailed project to study
the merger notification and procedures of its members and to formulate recommended
practices for its members to follow. In 2002, the ICN unanimously approved a set of
Guiding Principles, which was followed in 2003 by a set of Recommended Practices, cov-
ering such matters as the required nexus to the reviewing jurisdiction, the timing of re-
view, the clarity of notification thresholds, and requirements for initial notification. 4 6
Significantly, the ICN Guiding Principles and Recommended Practices do not alter, or
even address, any of the differences between jurisdictions. They simply identify a better
way forward.
Many of these provisions have been transposed into national legislation. The fact that a
particular policy has won the imprimatur of a consensus group of virtually all of the
world's antitrust agencies is a powerful endorsement, and it is certain that the ICN's rec-
ommendation has carried weight with national legislators that no one nation, individual,
or blue ribbon panel of experts would have. The majority of ICN member countries with
merger review regimes in place have adapted their national systems to conform with the
Recommended Practices. Recent amendments to Germany's Act Against Restraints of
Competition4 7 provide a concrete example of how the Recommended Practices are helping
to effect change. These amendments, part of a general legislative attempt to reduce un-
necessary bureaucracy, draw upon the ICN's Recommended Practices to introduce a dual
domestic turnover threshold to replace the current single party threshold.48 Among
others, Costa Rica, Belgium, India, Brazil, and Portugal have adopted or are considering
legislation that would bring their legislation in line with the Recommended Practices.
In addition, merger work at the ICN has included the development of recommended
practices for substantive merger analysis; the publication of a Merger Guidelines Workbook
45. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2007).
46. Intern'l Competition Network, Guiding Principles for Merger Notification and Review Procedures
and Recommended Practices for Merger Notification and Review Procedures, http://www.intemationalcom-
petitionnetwork.org/index.php/en/publication/294 (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
47. Third Act on The Reduction Of Bureaucratic Barriers In Particular Regarding Medium-Sized Enter-
prises (Third Medium-Sized Enterprises Relief Act), Mar. 17, 2009.
48. See Andreas Weitbrecht & Susanne Zuehlke, Germany Overview, in TtiE EuRoPEAN AN-11TRUST RE-
VIEW 2009 (Global Competition Review 2008), http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/10/sec-
tions/42/chapters/45 1/germany-overview/.
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has also been issued together with an Investigative Techniques Handbook, setting up a web-
site with merger templates and legislation for each jurisdiction, and other projects. 49
B. CARTELS
The battle against cartel activity forms a universally-accepted central role in antitrust
enforcement. The work of the ICN cartel working group has included the publication of
an Enforcement Techniques Manual setting out generally accepted forms of enforcement in
the area. The working group also holds annual cartel enforcement conferences where
antitrust authorities have the opportunity to build networks between enforcers and to
share best practices.50
C. UNILATERAL CONDUCT
While there is significant international consensus about the scope and purpose of cartel
and merger enforcement, consensus about anticompetitive unilateral conduct-known as
monopolization in the United States and abuse of dominance in most other jurisdic-
tions-lags behind within the international antitrust community. The reason is because
competition-which antitrust laws seek to promote-produces losers as well as winners.
It can be difficult to distinguish between vigorous competition in which one competitor
promotes offerings that consumers want at lower prices and anticompetitive exclusionary
conduct. Some jurisdictions place greater scrutiny on the conduct of dominant firms than
others. Some jurisdictions address perceived abusive conduct by firms that have achieved
a monopoly position, while others, including the United States, concern themselves only
with conduct through which monopoly power is gained or maintained. The work for the
ICN to tackle in this area is therefore particularly important yet challenging. These ef-
forts have resulted in recommended practices regarding the concept of dominance, and
reports on the objectives of unilateral conduct laws, predatory pricing, single brands/ex-
clusive dealing, and state-created monopolies.5
D. COMPETITION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
The ICPAC Report in 2000 envisioned a possible technical assistance role for the new
body that became the ICN. While the ICN has stopped short of providing technical
assistance to newer agencies, it has recognized the importance of the work and issued a
detailed report defining the problem of capacity building. The ICN also conducted a
detailed empirical study of technical assistance projects, with an eye to learning what had
worked and what had not, and issued a set of findings related to technical assistance.
49. For the work product of the mergers working group of the ICN, see Intern'l Competition Network,
Document Library Working Group: Mergers, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/index.php/
en/library/working-group/17 (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
50. For the work product of the cartels working group of the ICN, see Intern'l Competition Network,
Document Library Working Group: Cartels, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/index.php/
en/library/working-group/15 (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
51. For the work product of the unilateral conduct working group of the ICN, see Intem'l Competition
Network, Document Library Working Group: Unilateral Conduct, http://www.intemationalcompetitionnet-
work.org/index.php/en/library/working-group/18 (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
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There have also been more focused efforts at assisting new agencies, such as a partnership
program among more experienced and less experienced agencies and ongoing monthly
calls among case handlers to allow for a sharing of experience between newer and more
experienced agencies. 52
VII. Lessons Learned
The continuing success of the ICN relative to other efforts to deal with antitrust regu-
lation in the international arena points to some tentative lessons:
* Convergence-driven measures may have required more patience than a rules-based
approach, but the record in the merger areas shows the potential for convergence to
promote consistent approaches to antitrust law.
* Consensus-based recommendations give every jurisdiction the opportunity to re-
main in control of outcomes, with the result of avoiding threats to national
sovereignty.
" A network that includes regular contact among managers and line staff of counter-
part national agencies makes it more likely that the network's output will be in-
formed by the actual experience of the network's members. The contacts gained
through the network carries over to enforcement work, which results in greater
communication and coordination in actual cases.
• A "light" network, operating as a member-driven group of government agencies
without the support of a formal secretariat, can function effectively.
" Careful work must be taken to build consensus among members and external stake-
holders (non-government advisors) to reach results that will ultimately achieve buy-
in through changes to national legislation and practices.
" Participation by external stakeholders is essential to the success of an international
competition network, not only as a means of securing additional expertise in the
field, but by assuring that the work of the network will be bought into by national
authorities and other decision-makers.
To be sure, challenges remain. The opportunity to participate in the network has not
been firmly grasped by all. While developed competition agencies participate regularly,
and many developing agencies participate in the ICN's day-to-day work, obtaining full
participation by all remains a work in progress. The ICN has been fairly successful in
obtaining buy-in for its work product by its members. The imprimatur of the ICN has
also enabled its members to advance domestic changes in legislation consistent with its
work product. Challenges remain, however, in seeking implementation of its recommen-
dations by many external bodies, including legislators or regulators.
VIII. Conclusion
The theory of transnational networks is the subject of a growing literature that consid-
ers international cooperation in antitrust matters, together with cooperation models in the
52. For the work product of the competition policy implementation working group of the ICN, see Intern'l
Competition Network, Document Library Working Group: Competition Policy Implementation, http://
www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/index.php/en/library/working-group/16 (last visited Apr. 5,
2009).
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areas of securities and environmental law, to be among the best examples of how transna-
tional networks may operate in practice.5 3 While the International Competition Network
was not born out of a desire to test the theory of transnational networks in practice, it
effectively illustrates what an effective transnational network can achieve. When the
globalization of commerce transformed international antitrust from a theoretical concept
to a real problem, the practical limits of solving the problems through formal international
law obstructed progress. A voluntary network of competition agencies, with active partici-
pation by non-government advisors, has been able to pursue a course of convergence
where superior practices are identified and individual jurisdictions opt in.
53. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Kal Raustiala, TheArchitecture of Inter-
national Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 Va. J. Int'l Law, 1
(2002).
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